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SKI perspective 
Background 
For incident investigation the Swedish nuclear industry has been using the same method 
since the 90-ties, the MTO (Man Technology Organisation) method. The basis for the 
method is that human, organisational, and technical factors should be focused equally in 
an accident investigation. The method is based on HPES (Human Performance 
Enhancement System). In order to get a better understanding of how well the MTO 
method, compared to other methods, can find the root causes and prevent reoccurrences 
of events there was a need for an overview and evaluation within the field of incident 
investigation methods. 
 
Purpose 
The objective of this project was to survey the main accident investigation methods that 
have been developed since the early or mid-1990s and to develop well grounded 
principals or criteria that could be used to characterise the chosen methods. 
 
Result 
The different methods were catagorised due to the dimensions of coupling, going from 
loose to tight, and interactions (tractability). This led to four groups where the nuclear 
industry fit into the group that are tightly coupled and intractable and therefore need to 
use methods that are suitable for those. Examples of such methods are FRAM 
(Functional Resonance Accident Model) and STAMP (Systems-Theoretic Accident 
Modeling and Process). 
The majority of incidents that happens and are investigated by the nuclear industry can 
however be characterised to the group that is less tightly coupled and more tractable. 
Methods that suites that group are for example CREAM (Cognitive Reliability and 
Error Analysis) and the MTO method. There are also many incidents/low level events 
that can be investigated with even less powerful methods. 
To get some guidance in choosing the right method a number of questions can be asked, 
for example: 
1. Was the accident similar to something that has happened before, or was it new 
and unknown? (The reference should be the history of the installation, as well as 
industry wide.). 
2. Was the organisation ready to respond to the accident, in the sense that there 
were established procedures or guidelines available? 
3. Was the situation quickly brought under control or was the development 
lengthy? 
4. Was the accident and the material consequences confined to a clearly delimited 
subsystem (technological or organisational) or did it involve multiple 
subsystems, or the whole installation? 
5. Were the consequences on the whole expected / familiar or were they novel / 
unusual? 
6. Were the consequences in proportion to the initiating event, or were they 
unexpectedly large (or small)? 
 
While it may be convenient, or even necessary, for an organisation to adopt a specific 
method as its standard, this should always be done knowingly and with a willingness to 
reconsider the choice when the conditions so demand it. 
 
Through the study the SKI has increased its knowledge of different methods and their 
range of use. The MTO method is suitable for incidents that are somewhat complex but 
for simpler incidents/low level events it might be too powerful and time-consuming. 
The important thing is that one is aware of ones choices and how they affect the result 
and that the method chosen is appropriate for the situation so that the root causes can be 
identified. No incidents is however prevented just by investigating them but there is also 
a need for an organisation that deals with the results and makes sure that the right 
countermeasures are taken 
 
Further research 
There are today no further projects planned by the SKI within this field. We are 
however following the research in the field that is done by others. 
 
Project information 
SKI project coordinator: Pia Jacobsson. 
SKI referens: SKI 2007/1819, SSM2008/177 
Project number: 200703011 
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Summary 
The objective of this project was to survey the main accident investigation methods that 
have been developed since the early or mid-1990s. The motivation was the increasing 
frequency of accidents that defy explanations in simple terms, for instance cause-effect 
chains or “human error”. Whereas the complexity of socio-technical systems is steadily 
growing across all industrial domains, including nuclear power production, accident 
investigation methods are only updated when their inability to account for novel types 
of accidents and incidents becomes inescapable. Accident investigation methods 
therefore typically lag behind the socio-technological developments by 20 years or 
more. 
The project first compiled a set of methods from the recognised scientific literature and 
in major major research & development programs, excluding methods limited to risk 
assessment, technological malfunctions, human reliability, and safety management 
methods. An initial set of 21 methods was further reduced to seven by retaining only 
prima facie accident investigation methods and avoiding overlapping or highly similar 
methods. 
The second step was to develop a set of criteria used to characterise the methods. The 
starting point was Perrow’s (1984) description of normal accidents in socio-technical 
systems, which used the dimensions of coupling, going from loose to tight, and 
interactions, going from linear to complex. For practical reasons, the second dimension 
was changed to that of tractability or how easy it is to describe the system, where the 
sub-criteria are the level of detail, the availability of an articulated model, and the 
system dynamics. On this basis the seven selected methods were characterised in terms 
of the systems – or conditions – they could account for, leading to the following four 
groups: methods suitable for systems that are loosely coupled and tractable, methods 
suitable for systems that are tightly coupled and tractable, methods suitable for systems 
that are loosely coupled and intractable, and methods suitable for systems that are 
tightly coupled and intractable. The number of methods in each group were four, three, 
zero, and two, respectively. 
Faced with the need to investigate an accident it is essential that the chosen method is 
appropriate for the system and the situation. Nuclear power plants considered as 
systems are tightly coupled and more or less intractable and therefore require accident 
models and accident investigation methods that are capable of accounting for these 
features. If an accident concerns the NPP operation as a whole, the methods must be 
suitable for systems that are tightly coupled and intractable. If an accident only concerns 
the operation of a subsystem or a component, the methods must be suitable for systems 
that are tightly coupled and tractable, or possible loosely coupled and tractable. The 
report provides a proposal for how these characteristics can be determined. 
The conclusion is that no specific method is the overall best in the sense that it can be 
used for all conditions. While it may be convenient, or even necessary, for an 
organisation to adopt a specific method as its standard, this should always be done 
knowingly and with a willingness to reconsider the choice when the conditions so 
demand it. In five or ten years we must expect that the methods developed today will 
have been partly obsolete, not because the methods change but because the nature of 
socio-technical systems, and therefore the nature of accidents, do. 
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1 Objective 
The complexity of socio-technical systems has for many decades been steadily growing 
across all industrial domains, including nuclear power production. One tangible 
consequence is that many of the incidents and accidents that occur today defy simple 
explanations, for instance in terms of cause-effect chains. To explain what happens 
requires more elaborate approaches – which means more sophisticated models and more 
powerful methods. Accident models provide the principles that can be used to explain 
how accidents happen. They are a convenient way of referring to the set of axioms, 
assumptions, beliefs, and facts about accidents that form the basis for understanding and 
explaining specific events. The methods describe – or even prescribe – how an 
investigation should be performed in order to produce an explanation of the accident, 
typically in a step-by-step fashion. The purpose of the methods is to ensure that the 
model concepts are applied consistently and uniformly, thereby limiting the 
opportunities for subjective interpretations and variations. An accident investigation 
should clearly not depend on personal insights and skills, but should rely on generalised 
public knowledge and institutionalised common sense. 
The development of new methods and approaches has often been driven by the inability 
of established methods to account for novel types of accidents and incidents. Another 
motivation has been a lack of efficiency, in the sense that recommendations and 
precautions based on the usual explanations have not lead to the desired effects and 
improvements. A third motivation has been new theoretical insights, although this rarely 
has happened independently of the former. 
The objective of this project was to make a survey of the main accident investigation 
methods that have been developed in the last decade or so, i.e., since the early or mid-
1990s. The work consisted of two equally important parts. One was to compile a list of 
methods corresponding to the overall selection criteria, and from that to select a subset 
for more detailed consideration. The other was to develop an argued set of principles or 
criteria that could be used to characterise the methods. The aim of this survey has not 
been to recommend any specific method as the overall ‘best’, but rather to provide an 
analysis and synthesis that can serve as the basis for a choice in concrete cases. 
 
1.1 Accident Investigation and Accident Analysis 
While the project was focused on accident investigation methods, it soon became clear 
that most of the methods – established as well as newcomers – addresses issues of 
accident analysis rather than accident investigation. The difference between the two is 
one of scope. An accident investigation logically covers everything from the initial 
planning of how to investigate an accident, allocation and scheduling of resources, 
collection of data and information, analysis of the same, recommendations following the 
analysis, implementation of the recommendations, and finally an evaluation of the 
effects of the recommendations. An accident analysis focuses on how to understand 
what happened based on the available data and information. It is thus properly speaking 
a subset or part of the investigation. The analysis will indirectly determine the data 
collection, particularly if it is being used regularly in an organisation, and also to some 
extent constrain the recommendations (Hollnagel, 2008). Although the use of a specific 
accident analysis method will therefore have consequences for other parts of the 
investigation, this is normally not addressed by the accident analysis method. Since 
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understanding why an accident happened for obvious reasons is the primary concern, 
most methods emphasise that and pay little or no attention to the other parts of the 
investigation. 
 
2 Background 
A previous SKI study (Harms-Ringdahl, 1996) surveyed fifteen methods for risk 
assessment from an industrial perspective. Of these, the following four were 
characterised as directly applicable to accident investigation: 
z Deviation analysis (avvikelseanalys), 
z Human Error Analytical Taxonomy (HEAT), 
z Management Oversight and Risk Tree (MORT), and 
z Safety Management and Organization Review Technique (SMORT), 
while two were considered potentially applicable: 
z CRisis Intervention in Offshore Production (CRIOP), and 
z International Safety Rating System (ISRS). 
 
2.1 Changing notions of risk and safety 
Most of the methods for risk assessment and accident investigation that are used today 
in nuclear power production, as well as in many other industries, have their origin in the 
1960s. This is the period where the technical or engineering analysis methods were 
developed, in response to the growing complexity of technological systems. Examples 
are Fault Trees, which were developed in 1961 to evaluate the launch control system for 
the Minuteman ICBM (cf. Leveson, 1995), Hazard and Operability Analysis (HAZOP) 
which was developed by Imperial Chemical Industries in England in the early 1960s 
(CISHC, 1977), and Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) which was originally 
developed by the US military in 1949 but later superceded by the Failure Mode, Effects 
and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) (MIL-STD-1629A, 1980). Another period of rapid 
growth occurred in the beginning of the 1980s, mainly in response to the TMI accident 
in 1979. This led to the recognition that human factors and human errors played a 
significant role in system safety, hence that it was necessary for risk assessment and 
accident investigation methods to go beyond the technological system. The concern for 
the human factor was later extended to cover organisations and organisational factors as 
well, with the prominence of ‘safety culture’ as a good example. The direct motivation 
was also in this case a serious adverse event, namely the Chernobyl accident in 1986. 
Since the mid-1990s there has been an additional growth, although more often 
incremental than innovative. This growth has taken place to answer the perceived need 
among theorists and practitioners of a re-orientation in thinking about safety, in order to 
develop methods and approaches that are both more efficient in use and better grounded 
in their concepts and constructs. 
Some of the major changes and developments since the mid-1990s have been: 
z An increasing emphasis of the organisational factor, spurred by Jim Reason’s 
book on organisational accidents (1997), 
z the increasing importance of software (e.g., the concept of Safeware; Leveson, 
1995), 
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z the emphasis on high reliability organisations, (e.g., Weick et al., 1999), 
z the changing perspective on causality, moving from sequential models to 
systemic models (Hollnagel, 2004), 
z the associated change in view on “human error”, from the “old” look to the 
“new” look (Dekker, 2006), 
z the change from training in specific skills to training in general communication 
and collaboration (Helmreich et al., 1999), 
z the change from reactive to proactive safety, as marked by resilience 
engineering, (Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2006). 
 
In the same period, i.e., since the mid-1990s, the growing complexity of socio-technical 
systems has also necessitated the development of more powerful accident investigation 
methods and analytical principles. This complexity, which was aptly diagnosed by 
Perrow (1984), has unfortunately often been marked by serious accidents, and shows no 
sign of abating. Some of the better known examples are the JCO accident at Tokai-
Mura, Japan (1999), the space shuttle Columbia disaster (2003), and the Überlingen 
mid-air collision (2002) – plus literally thousands of small and large accidents in 
practically every industrial domain. This development is not isolated to a specific 
industrial domain, such as NPP, but has happened in many different industries and 
service functions. 
One consequence of this has been the realisation that accident investigation and risk 
assessment are two sides of the same coin, in the sense that they consider the same 
events or phenomena either after they have happened (retrospectively) or before they 
happen (prospectively). In the prospective case there is, of course, the possibility that an 
event may never occur; indeed, the main rationale for risk assessment is to ensure that 
this is the case. The dependency between accident investigation and risk assessment has 
been emphasised both by the so-called second generation HRA methods (in particular 
ATHEANA, Cooper et al., 1996; CREAM, Hollnagel 1998; and MERMOS, Le Bot at 
al., 1999), and is also a central premise for Resilience Engineering (Hollnagel, Woods, 
& Leveson, 2006). 
 
3 The Need and Purpose of Accident Investigations 
In order to ensure an acceptable level of safety in nuclear power operations, as well as 
in any other complex industrial process, it is necessary to be able to learn from 
experience. Knowledge of what has happened previously in an industrial installation 
such as a NPP, and in particular knowledge of why something went wrong, is essential 
in order to be able to draw the right conclusions from past events. Such knowledge can 
serve either to prevent a recurrence or repetition of the same event, to prevent the 
occurrence of similar events, or to protect against specific types of adverse outcomes. 
In the investigation and analysis of past events it is common to distinguish among 
outcomes of different severity, where typical categories are accidents, incidents, and 
near-misses (Renborg et al., 2007). The tradition of distinguishing among different 
types of outcomes was established by Heinrich (1929), who emphasised the difference 
between the accident and the injury (or outcome). Heinrich argued that it was 
misleading to consider only accidents which led to major injuries since, according to his 
own investigations, the ratio of minor injuries to major injuries was 29 to 1. He 
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introduced the category of near-accidents, meaning those events that produced no injury 
whatsoever although they had the potential power to do so (Ibid, p. 4). From the 1980s 
and onwards it became common to refer to near misses, defined as situations “where an 
accident could have happened had there been no timely and effective recovery” (van der 
Schaaf & Kanse, 2004), and to incidents as something in between. (Depending on the 
domain, the definitions often refer to the seriousness of the outcome, for instance 
whether human life was lost.) This project has looked only at accidents, and has not 
considered incidents or near misses. It is possible, and even likely, that the same 
approach can be used to characterise how other outcome types are investigated, but to 
argue this issue has been beyond the scope of the work reported here. 
The purpose of an accident investigation is, of course, to understand why the accident 
happened. This is often expressed as a question of finding the possible cause or causes, 
and since the late 1970s or early 1980s it has been common both to look for clearly 
recognisable causes (corresponding to Aristotle’s notion of effective cause1) and to 
point to the “human error” as a main cause of accidents (e.g., Hollnagel, 1998). As far 
as the latter tendency is concerned, it is important to keep in mind that finding the 
causes is a psychological rather than a logical process. In particular, 
“... ‘human error’ is not a well defined category of human performance. 
Attributing error to the actions of some person, team, or organisation is 
fundamentally a social and psychological process and not an objective, technical 
one.”  
(Woods et al., 1994, p. xvii) 
While there are few who will dispute the need to learn from experience, such learning 
can come about in many different ways and may range from being thorough to being 
quite superficial. To learn from experience requires more than collecting data from 
accidents, incidents, and near-misses or building a company-wide database. Some 
organisations nevertheless seem to believe that this is sufficient, probably because they 
confuse data with experience. But whereas data are relatively easy to amass and can be 
collected more or less as a routine or procedure, experience requires the investment of 
considerable effort and time in a more or less continuous fashion. Accident 
investigation is an important part of learning from experience. Some of the fundamental 
issues that an investigation method must address are: what is reported – and when? how 
events are analysed? how the results are used and communicated? and what the effects 
are on safety and daily practice? 
An accident investigation always follows a method or a procedure. There are many 
different methods available, both between and within domains, that may differ with 
respect to how well formulated and how well founded they are. The importance of 
having a good method cannot be overstated. The method will direct the investigation to 
look at certain things and not at others. A root cause analysis, for instance, will tend to 
look for definitive causes while a ‘Swiss cheese’ or epidemiological analysis will tend 
to look for latent conditions. It is simply not possible to begin an investigation with a 
completely open mind, just as it is not possible passively to ‘see’ what is there. Accident 
 
1 Aristotle proposed a distinction between four types of causes: (1) the material cause is that from 
which something comes into existence, i.e., the parts of a system; (2) the formal cause tells us what 
something is, the fundamental principles or general laws; (3) the efficient cause is that from which the 
change or the ending of the change first starts, corresponding to the present day concept of a cause-effect 
relation; and (4) the final cause, or the purpose, is that for the sake of which something exists or is done, 
including both purposeful and instrumental actions and activities. 
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investigations, as well as searches in general, seem, to conform to the What-You-Look-
For-Is-What-You-Find (WYLFIWYF) principle (Hollnagel, 2008). Since an 
investigation method always will bias the investigation, it is important that investigators 
not only known the methods they use, in the sense that they are proficient users, but also 
that they acknowledge the explicit and implicit assumptions that every method makes. 
(In terms of the terminology, it is common to find the terms analysis and investigation 
used as if they were synonyms. This is, of course, not the case, since an accident 
investigation always is more comprehensive than an accident analysis. In addition to 
making the analysis, an investigation requires planning, data collection, registration, 
recommendations, implementation, and evaluation. The objective of this project has 
been to look at accident investigation methods, but to do so it has been necessary also to 
consider some accident analysis methods.) 
 
4 The growing complexity of socio-technical systems 
The main motivation for developing a new accident investigation method is usually the 
occurrence of a major accident that defies existing methods, as described above. The 
reason why this happens is simply that socio-technological systems develop 
continuously and rapidly, driven by a combination of technological innovation, 
commercial considerations, and user demands. In contrast to that, risk assessment and 
safety management methods develop at a far more moderate pace – if at all – which 
means that they rarely are able to represent or address the actual complexity of 
industrial systems. To the extent that methods develop, it is usually as a delayed 
reflection of “new” types of accidents. The outcome can be that methods focus on a 
specific, salient factor of an event (e.g., violations after Chernobyl), or that they become 
more comprehensive by trying to draw together the collective experience and changes 
in view (e.g., second generation HRA). 
Existing accident prevention, risk reduction, and safety measures must obviously refer 
to the established understanding or the commonly accepted state-of-the-art. If anything 
happens despite these precautions it is therefore something that could not have been 
addressed by the methods and models that were used, i.e., something that went beyond 
the established understanding. Such events therefore challenge the methods, and it will 
be impossible to produce an adequate explanation. 
One important characterisation – if not quite an explanation – of this development was 
given by the American sociologist Charles Perrow in a book called Normal Accidents 
(Perrow, 1984). The fundamental thesis of the book was that the (Western) society that 
existed then, and in particular the technological environments that provided the 
foundation for that society, had become so complex that accidents were bound to occur. 
Accidents were thus an inevitable part of using and working with complex systems, 
hence normal rather than rare occurrences. Since Perrow published his analyses neither 
the socio-technical systems, nor the problems that follow, have become any simpler. 
Perrow built his case by going through a massive set of evidence from various types of 
accidents and disasters. The areas included were Nuclear Power Plants, Petrochemical 
Plants, Aircraft and Airways, Marine Accidents, Earthbound Systems (such as dams, 
quakes, mines, and lakes), and finally Exotic Systems (such as space, weapons and 
DNA). The list was quite formidable, even in the absence of major accidents that 
occurred later, such as Challenger, Chernobyl, and Zebrügge. 
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Perrow proposed two descriptive dimensions to characterise different types of 
accidents: interactions and coupling. With regard to the interactions a complex system – 
in contrast to a linear system – was characterised by the following: 
z Indirect or inferential information sources. 
z Limited isolation of failed components. 
z Limited substitution of supplies and materials. 
z Limited understanding of some processes (associated with transformation 
processes). 
z Many control parameters with potential interaction. 
z Many common-mode connections of components not in production sequence. 
z Personnel specialization limits awareness of interdependencies. 
z Proximate production steps. 
z Tight spacing of equipment. 
z Unfamiliar or unintended feedback loops. 
 
According to Perrow, complex systems are difficult to understand and comprehend and 
are furthermore unstable in the sense that the limits for safe operation (the normal 
performance envelope) are quite narrow. Perrow contended that we have complex 
systems basically because we do not know how to produce the same output by means of 
linear ones. And once built, we keep them because we have made ourselves dependent 
upon their products! 
Systems can also be described with respect to their coupling, which can vary between 
being loose or tight. The meaning of coupling is that subsystems and/or components are 
connected or depend upon each other in a functional sense. Thus, tightly coupled 
systems are characterised by the following: 
z Buffers and redundancies are part of the design, hence deliberate. 
z Delays in processing not possible. 
z Sequences are invariant. 
z Substitutions of supplies, equipment, personnel is limited and anticipated in the 
design. 
z There is little slack possible in supplies, equipment, and personnel. 
z There is only one method to reach the goal. 
z Tightly coupled systems are difficult to control because an event in one part of 
the system quickly will spread to other parts. 
 
Perrow used these two dimensions of interactions and coupling to illustrate differences 
among various types of systems, cf. Figure 1. 
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The worst possible combination with regard to the accident potential is, of course, a 
complex and tightly coupled system. Perrow's prime example of that was the nuclear 
power plant, with Three Mile Island accident as a case in point. Other systems that 
belong to the same category were, e.g., aircraft and chemical plants. It is characteristic, 
and probably not a coincidence, that all the systems Perrow describes in the book were 
tightly coupled and only differed with respect to their complexity, i.e., they were mostly 
in the second quadrant. 
 
Figure 1: The coupling-interaction diagram (Perrow, 1984) 
Perrow’s thesis, as expressed by Figure 1, is relevant for accident investigation 
methods, since the explanation of an accident must be able to account for the nature of 
interactions and the degree of coupling in the system. If we, for the sake of argument, 
refer to the four quadrants of Figure 1, then it is clear that systems in quadrant 3 differ 
in important respects from systems in quadrant 2. A method that may be adequate to 
explain an accident in a quadrant 3 system, such as a person that is injured while 
working at an assembly line, is unlikely to be sufficient to explain an accident in a 
quadrant 2 system, such as an INES event at a nuclear power plant. (Even though the 
converse is not necessarily true, it may be inefficient to use the more complex and 
powerful methods to investigate accidents in simple systems.) The diagram therefore 
provides an external frame of reference for accident investigations methods in addition 
to the more traditional requirements such as consistency, reliability, usability, etc. 
 
5 Initial Set of Methods 
Although genuinely new methods are quite rare, there is nevertheless a steady flow of 
methods to the “market”. Most of these, however, are variations of the basic 
approaches, either to address the needs of a specific domain or application, or as a result 
of studies, research projects, etc. 
It is practically impossible to list all the methods that have been proposed during the last 
10-15 years. Instead, a set was compiled of methods that have been recognised in the 
general scientific literature and in the programs of major research & development 
organisations. The compilation has made use of a number of reports and surveys such as 
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CCPS (1992), DOE (1999) and Sklet (2002). The methods already described by Harms-
Ringdahl (1996) – Deviation Analysis, HEAT, MORT, and SMORT – have not been 
included in the set. Neither have methods that properly speaking were aimed at risk 
assessment (e.g., Bayesian Belief Networks combined with Fault Trees), technological 
malfunctions (e.g., Sneak Path Analysis), human reliability (e.g., ATHEANA), or safety 
management methods (e.g., TRIPOD). 
The first survey of the literature, applying the selection criteria described above, 
produce a list of 21 accident investigation or accident analysis methods. The methods 
are briefly identified and described in Table 1 below. 
 
Table 1: Initial set of accident investigation methods. 
Acronym Method name Short description  Source and 
Year 
AEB Accident Evolution 
and Barrier Analysis 
The Accident Evolution and Barrier Function 
(AEB) model provides a method for analysis of 
incidents and accidents that models the 
evolution towards an incident/accident as a 
series of interactions between human and 
technical systems. 
Svensson 
(2001) 
BA Barrier Analysis Barrier analysis is used to identify hazards 
associated with an accident and the barriers 
that should have been in place to prevent it. A 
barrier is any means used to control, prevent, or 
impede the hazard from reaching the target. 
Dianous & 
Fiévez (2006) 
CA Change Analysis This technique is used to examine an accident 
by analysing the difference between what has 
occurred before or was expected and the actual 
sequence of events. The investigator 
performing the change analysis identifies 
specific differences between the accident–free 
situation and the accident scenario. These 
differences are evaluated to determine whether 
the differences caused or contributed to the 
accident. 
DOE (1999) 
CREAM Cognitive Reliability 
and Error Analysis 
Method 
CREAM can be used both predictively and 
retrospectively. The retrospective use (accident 
analysis) is based on a clear distinction 
between that which can be observed (called 
phenotypes) and that which must be inferred 
(called genotypes). The genotypes used in 
CREAM are divided into three categories: 
individual, technological and organisational. 
Hollnagel 
(1998) 
ECFC Events and causal 
factors charting 
Events and causal factors charting is a 
graphical display of the accident’s chronology 
and is used primarily for compiling and 
organising evidence to portray the sequence of 
the accident’s events. 
DOE (1999) 
15
  
Acronym Method name Short description  Source and 
Year 
ECFCA Events and Causal 
Factors Charting and 
Analysis 
The events and causal factors chart may be 
used to determine the causal factors of an 
accident. This process is an important first step 
in later determining the root causes of an 
accident. Events and causal factors analysis 
requires deductive reasoning to determine 
which events and/or conditions that contributed 
to the accident. 
DOE (1999) 
FRAM Functional 
Resonance Accident 
Model 
A method for accident investigation as well as 
risk assessment based on a description of 
system functions. Non-linear propagation of 
events are described by means of functional 
resonance. 
Hollnagel 
(2004) 
HERA HERA HERA is a method to identify and quantify the 
impact of the human factor in incident/accident 
investigation, safety management and 
prediction of potential new forms of errors 
arising from new technology. Human error is 
seen as a potential weak link in the ATM 
system and, therefore, measures must be taken 
to prevent errors and their impact, and to 
maximise other human qualities such as error 
detection and recovery. HERA is predicated on 
the notion that human error is the primary 
contributor to accidents and incidents. 
Isaac et al. 
(2002) 
HFACS Human Factors 
Analysis and 
Classification System 
HFACS identifies the human causes of an 
accident and provides a tool to not only assist in
the investigation process, but to target training 
and prevention efforts. HFACS looks at four 
levels of human failure, referring to the "Swiss 
cheese" model. These levels include unsafe 
acts (operator error), preconditions for unsafe 
acts (such as fatigue and inadequate 
communication), unsafe supervision (such as 
pairing inexperienced aviators for a difficult 
mission), and organizational influences (such 
as lack of flight time because of budget 
constraints). 
FAA/NTIS 
(2000) 
HFIT Human factors 
investigation tool 
HFIT was developed on a theoretical basis with 
reference to existing tools and models. It 
collects four types of human factors information 
including (a) the action errors occurring 
immediately prior to the incident, (b) error 
recovery mechanisms, in the case of near 
misses, (c) the thought processes which lead to 
the action error and (d) the underlying causes. 
Gordon, Flin 
& Mearns 
(2005) 
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Acronym Method name Short description  Source and 
Year 
HINT – 
J-HPES 
HINT – J-HPES HINT is a recent development of J-HPES, the 
Japanese version of INPO’s Human 
Performance Evaluation System, cf. below. The 
overall principle is to use a root cause analysis 
of small events to identify trends, and to as a 
basis for proactive prevention of accidents. The 
method comprises a number of steps (similar to 
SAFER, cf. below). These are: Step 1: 
Understand the event. Step 2: Collect and 
classify causal factor data. Step 3: Causal 
analysis, using root cause analysis. And Step 4: 
Proposal of countermeasures. 
Takano et al. 
(1994) 
HPES Human Performance 
Enhancement System 
A method sponsored by INPO that utilizes a 
family of techniques to investigate events, with 
particular emphasis on determining human 
performance aspects. The HPES methodology 
incorporates many tools such as task analysis, 
change analysis, barrier analysis, cause and 
effect analysis, and event and causal factor 
charting. Additionally, many similar 
methodologies have been developed from 
HPES and adapted where necessary to suit the 
specific requirements of individual 
organizations. 
INPO (1989) 
MTO Människa-Teknologi-
Organisation 
The basis for the MTO-analysis is that human, 
organisational, and technical factors should be 
focused equally in an accident investigation. 
The method is based on HPES (Human 
Performance Enhancement System) 
Rollenhagen 
(1995); 
Bento (1992) 
PEAT Procedural Event 
Analysis Tool 
The objective of PEAT is to help airlines 
develop effective remedial measures to prevent 
the occurrence of future similar errors. The 
PEAT process relies on a non-punitive 
approach to identify key contributing factors to 
crew decisions. Using this process, the airline 
safety officer would be able to provide 
recommendations aimed at controlling the 
effect of contributing factors. PEAT includes 
database storage, analysis, and reporting 
capabilities.  
Moodi & 
Kimball 
(2004). 
RCA Root cause analysis Root cause analysis identifies underlying 
deficiencies in a safety management system 
that, if corrected, would prevent the same and 
similar accidents from occurring. Root cause 
analysis is a systematic process that uses the 
facts and results from the core analytic 
techniques to determine the most important 
reasons for the accident. 
E.g., IAEA 
(1999) 
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Acronym Method name Short description  Source and 
Year 
SAFER SAFER 2007 SAFER is a generic method for accident 
investigation developed by TEPCO (J). Step 1 
Understand HF Engineering. Step 2 Make an 
event flow chart: Arrange information to 
understand the detail of the event and to have a 
basis for communication and sharing of 
information. Step 3 Pick up Problematic Points. 
Step 4 Produce a Background Factors 
Causality Diagram, that represents causality 
among the factors. Step 5 Think out measures 
to cut off the causality from background factors 
(according to the diagram or event flow chart). 
Step 6 Prioritize the Measures. Step 7 
Implement the Measures. Step 8 Evaluate the 
Effects 
Yoshizawa 
(1999) 
SCAT Systematic Cause 
Analysis Technique 
The International Loss Control Institute (ILCI) 
developed SCAT for the support of 
occupational incident investigation. The ILCI 
Loss Causation Model is the framework for the 
SCAT system. The result of an accident is loss, 
e.g. harm to people, properties, products or the 
environment. The incident (the contact between 
the source of energy and the “victim”) is the 
event that precedes the loss. The immediate 
causes of an accident are the circumstances 
that immediately precede the contact. They 
usually can be seen or sensed. Frequently they 
are called unsafe acts or unsafe conditions, but 
in the ILCI-model the terms substandard acts 
(or practices) and substandard conditions are 
used. 
Bird & 
Germain 
(1985) 
STAMP STAMP The hypothesis underlying STAMP is that 
system theory is a useful way to analyze 
accidents, particularly system accidents. 
Accidents occur when external disturbances, 
component failures, or dysfunctional 
interactions among system components are not 
adequately handled by the control system. 
Safety is viewed as a control problem, and is 
managed via constraints by a control structure 
embedded in an adaptive socio-technical 
system. Understanding why an accident 
occurred requires determining why the control 
structure was ineffective. Preventing future 
accidents requires designing a control structure 
that will enforce the necessary constraints. 
Systems are viewed as interrelated 
components that are kept in a state of dynamic 
equilibrium by feedback loops of information 
and control. 
Leveson 
(2004) 
18
  
Acronym Method name Short description  Source and 
Year 
STEP Sequentially Timed 
Events Plotting 
They propose a systematic process for accident 
investigation based on multi-linear events 
sequences and a process view of the accident 
phenomena. With the process concept, a 
specific accident begins with the action that 
started the transformation from the described 
process to an accident process, and ends with 
the last connected harmful event of that 
accident process. 
Hendrick and 
Benner 
(1987). 
Swiss 
cheese 
Reason's Swiss 
Cheese model 
The Swiss Cheese model of accident causation 
is a model used in the risk analysis and risk 
management of human systems. It likens 
human systems to multiple slices of Swiss 
cheese, stacked together, side by side. It was 
originally propounded by British psychologist 
James T. Reason in 1990, and has since 
gained widespread acceptance and use in 
healthcare, in the aviation safety industry, and 
in emergency service organizations. It is 
sometimes called the cumulative act effect. 
Reason 
(1990, 1997) 
TRACEr Technique for 
Retrospective 
Analysis of Cognitive 
Errors 
TRACEr provides a human error identification 
technique specifically for use in the air traffic 
control domain. It builds on error models in 
other fields and integrates Wickens' (1992) 
model of information processing in ATC. 
TRACEr is represented in a series of decision 
flow diagrams. The method marks a shift away 
from knowledge based errors in other error 
analysis tools to better reflect the visual and 
auditory nature of ATM. It has proved 
successful in analysing errors in AIRPROX 
reports to derive measures for reducing errors 
and their adverse effects.  
Shorrock and 
Kirwan (1999; 
2002) 
 
It is clear, even from the brief descriptions of the above list, that many methods are 
related, in the sense that they refer to the same basic principles. Examples are the 
various methods that look at barriers or the methods that look at root causes. It is 
therefore necessary to make a selection of a smaller set of methods that deserve a closer 
look. In order to do so it is necessary first to consider the criteria on which such a 
selection can be made. 
 
6 Criteria for comparison of accident investigation 
methods 
It is quite common in method surveys to propose some criteria for selection, according 
to which the “best” method – or methods – can be found. This happens for accident 
investigation methods, as well as for methods of other kinds, e.g., Swain (1989) or 
Kirwan (1994). In this project the objective was not to find a “best” method, but provide 
a basis for selecting methods that are appropriate for a given purpose, i.e., a kind of off-
line decision support. 
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In a study commissioned by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration 
(OSHA) in the US, Benner (1985) rated 14 different accident models and 17 different 
accident investigations methods used by various US agencies. He began by a set of 
evaluation criteria and a rating scheme developed from user data, statutes, applications, 
and work products.  
This led to a set of ten criteria that were used to rate the accident models as shown in 
Table 2. Most of them actually refer to the quality of the outcome of the analysis 
(realistic, definitive, satisfying, comprehensive, disciplining, consistent, direct, and 
understandable or visible) rather than the model as such, although that in some sense 
also reflects model characteristics. Two criteria relate more directly to the nature of the 
accident model, namely that it should be functional and non-causal.  
 
Table 2: Benner’s (1985) criteria for rating accident models. 
Model evaluation 
criteria 
Definition 
Realistic The investigation should result in a realistic description of the events that 
have actually occurred.  
Definitive An investigation process should provide criteria to identify and define the 
data that is needed to describe what happened. 
Satisfying The results should be satisfying for those who initialised the investigation 
and other individuals that demand results from the investigations. 
Comprehensive An investigation process should be comprehensive so there is no confusion 
about what happened, no unsuspected gaps or holes in the explanation, 
and no conflict of understanding among those who read the report. 
Disciplining An investigation process should provide an orderly, systematic framework 
and set of procedures to discipline the investigators’ tasks in order to focus 
their efforts on important and necessary tasks and avoid duplicative or 
irrelevant tasks.  
Consistent Model must be theoretically consistent with an agency's safety program 
concepts.  
Direct The investigation process should provide results that do not require 
collection of more data before the needed controls can be identified and 
changes made.  
Functional An investigation process should be functional in order to make the job 
efficient, e.g. by helping the investigator to determine which events were 
part of the accident process as well as those events that were unrelated.  
Non-causal An investigation should be conducted in a non-causal framework and result 
in an objective description of the accident process events. Attribution of 
cause or fault can only be considered separate from, and after the 
understanding of the accident process is completed to satisfy this criterion.  
Understandable or 
visible 
The output should be readily understandable.  
 
Benner’s initial assumption was that all accident investigation programs were driven by 
accident models, and that the methods could therefore be evaluated against common 
criteria. But his analyses led him to conclude that this assumption was not valid. 
Instead, there were three types of relationships between the accident models and 
investigation methodologies. In the first case, the accident model came before the 
accident investigation methodology, hence determined that. In the second case the 
relation was reversed, i.e., that the investigation methodology determined the accident 
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model. Finally, in the third case, a chosen (institutionalised or traditional) analysis 
method would determine both the accident model and the investigation methodology, 
without the model or investigation methodology particularly influencing each other. In 
view of this conclusion Benner developed separate criteria for evaluating the accident 
investigation methodologies. These criteria are listed in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Benner’s (1985) criteria for rating accident investigation methods. 
Method evaluation 
criteria 
Definition 
Encouragement Methodology must encourage harmonious participation 
Independence Methodology must produce blameless outputs 
Initiatives Methodology must support personal initiatives 
Discovery Methodology must support timely discovery process 
Competence Methodology mus increase employee competence 
Standards Methodology must show definite corrections 
Enforcement Methodology must show expectations and behavioural norms 
States Methodology must encourage States to take responsibility 
Accuracy Methodology must help test accuracy of output 
Closed Loop Methodology must be compatible with “pre-investigations” (or 
safety analyses) of potential accidents: 
 
It is interesting to note also here that the criteria adress aspects of the methods in use, 
e.g., encouragement or initiatives, rather than aspects of a method qua method, e.g., 
reliability or independence of user knowledge. 
(It may be of interest to note that the top three accident models, according to Benner’s 
criteria, were the Events Process model, the Energy Flow Process model, and the Fault 
Tree model. Similarly, the top three accident investigation methods were Events 
Analysis, the MORT system, and Fault Tree Analysis. Benner concluded his survey by 
recommending both that “significant accident investigation program changes should be 
considered in agencies and organizations using lower-ranked accident models or 
investigation methodologies”, and that “a compelling need exists for more exhaustive 
research into accident model and accident investigation methodology selection 
decisions.” Sklet (2002) looked at 15 different methods using the same criteria, but only 
characterised them in a final table, without indicating any rank order.)  
A different approach is found in a survey of accident models and error classifications 
(Hollnagel, 1998), which proposed the following six criteria (Table 4). 
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Table 4: Hollnagel’s (1998) criteria for classifying accident models and methods. 
Criterion Definition 
Analytic capability Analytic capability, which refers to the ability of each approach to support 
a retrospective analysis of events involving human erroneous actions. 
The specific outcome of a retrospective analysis should be a description 
of the characteristics of human cognition that are included in the set of 
assumed causes.  
Predictive capability Predictive capability, which refers to the capability of each approach to 
predict the probable type of erroneous actions (phenotype) in specific 
situations. If possible, predictions should also be made of the likely 
magnitude or severity of the erroneous actions. None of the models are 
actually very good for making predictions, because predictions require 
both a valid model and a reliable data base. While better models are 
gradually emerging a reliable data base still awaits a concerted effort. 
Technical basis Technical content, as the extent to which models generated from within 
each approach are grounded in a clearly identifiable model of human 
action. 
Relation to existing 
taxonomies 
The relation to and/or dependence on existing classification schemes, as 
the extent to which each of the three approaches is linked to viable 
systems for classifying the erroneous actions that occur in a real-world 
processing environment. 
Practicality Practicality of each approach, which refers to the ease with which each 
approach can be turned into a practical method or made operational. 
Cost-effectiveness Finally, the relative costs and benefits that are associated with each 
approach. 
 
These criteria aim more directly at the qualities of the method, both with regard to the 
theoretical basis and with regard to its efficacy. In some sense they consider both the 
accident model (analytic capability, predictive capability, technical basis, relation to 
existing taxonomies) and the investigation method (practicality, cost-effectiveness).  
In addition to sets of criteria that aim to distinguish among methods, hence to serve as 
the basis for a choice in a specific situation, there are also more practical criteria that are 
common to all methods.  
z Reliability – whether the method will give the same result if applied again (or to 
a similar case), and the degree to which the method is independent of the 
user/analyst and his/her knowledge and experience.  
z Audit capabilities – whether it is possible to retrace the analysis and reconstruct 
the choices, decisions, or categorisations made during the analysis. This 
corresponds to Benner’s criterion of comprehensiveness. 
z Time to learn – how long time does it take to learn to use the method and to 
become a proficient user. Although this clearly is a one-time investment, it is 
sometimes seen as an argument against adopting a new method. 
z Resources needed – or how difficult/easy it is to use the method. Among the 
main resources are people (hours of work), time, information and documentation 
needs, etc. 
z Validity – whether the findings provided by the method are the proper ones. 
This is a very contentious issue, since there is no easy way of establishing the 
correctness of the findings. It is very unusual that the same accident is 
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investigated in more ways than one., and even then there are no obvious 
independent criteria by which to rate the findings. 
 
The motivation for comparing and rating different methods is to be able to choose the 
method that is best suited to solve a given problem. Although criteria such as speed, 
resource demands, and prevalence in an industry are not unimportant, the primary 
concern must be whether an investigation method can do what it is supposed to do, 
namely produce an adequate explanation or account of why an adverse event (an 
accident or an incident) occurred. An investigation method is basically a tool, and it is 
clearly crucial that the tool is well-suited to the task at hand. Although most tools can be 
used for different purposes – a wrench can, for instance, be used as hammer – it is 
obviously better and more efficient if the tool fit the job precisely. This goes for 
physical tools as well as for methods. It is therefore important to be able to characterise 
methods with regard to how well they fit the task at hand, which in practice means how 
well they can represent and account for the complexity of the actual situations.  
Few of the criteria referred to above make any reference to this quality, the main 
exception being Benner’s criteria of functional and non-causal. A good starting point 
can, however, be found in Perrow’s (1984) description of the complexity of socio-
technical systems, cf. Figure 1. Perrow proposed the two dimensions of coupling, going 
from loose to tight, and interactions, going from linear to complex. While the notion of 
coupling is relatively straightforward, the notion of complexity must be used with some 
care, since it can refer either to the ontological or the epistemological complexity2 
(Pringle, 1951). For practical reasons it is preferable to use a different concept, namely 
how easy it is to describe the system, where the extremes are tractable and intractable 
systems. A system, or a process, is tractable if the principles of functioning are known, 
if descriptions are simple and with few details, and most importantly if the system does 
not change while it is being described. Conversely, a system or a process is intractable if 
the principles of functioning are only partly known or even unknown, if descriptions are 
elaborate with many details, and if the system may change before the description is 
completed. A good example of a tractable system is a post office, or rather the normal 
functions of a post office, or the operation of a home furnace. Similarly, a good example 
of an intractable system is the outage at a NPP or the activities in a hospital emergency 
department. In the latter cases the activities are not standardised and change so rapidly 
that it is never possible to produce a detailed and complete description.  
Using this modification of the terminology, we can propose a new version of Perrow’s 
diagram, as shown in Figure 2. (Note that this also means that some of the examples 
used by Perrow have to change position; in addition, some examples (e.g., nuclear 
weapons accidents) have been deleted, while others (financial markets) have been 
introduced. These changes are, however, illustrative rather than exhaustive.) 
 
 
2 Epistemological complexity can be defined as the number of parameters needed to define a system 
fully in space and time. Ontological complexity has no scientifically discoverable meaning as it is not 
possible to refer to the complexity of a system independently of how it is viewed or described. 
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Following this principle, accident investigation methods should be characterised in 
terms of the systems – or conditions – they can account for. Despite Benner’s (1985) 
concerns, this does depend on the underlying accident model. For instance, a simple 
linear accident model – such as the domino model (Heinrich, 1931) – can be used to 
account for certain types of accidents and not for others. The domino model is suitable 
for systems – hence for accidents – that are loosely coupled and tractable. The reason is 
simply that most systems were of that type at the time it was developed. Nuclear power 
plants considered as systems are, however, tightly coupled and more or less intractable. 
They therefore require accident models and accident investigation methods that are 
capable of accounting for these features. It is therefore reasonable to characterise 
investigation methods in terms of which applications they can account for. While this 
will not by itself determine whether one method is “better” than another, it will make it 
possible to choose a method that is suitable for a specific purpose and/or system and 
thereby also to exclude methods that are unable to meet the requirements of an 
investigation. 
 
7 Selection of accident investigation methods 
Following the principles outlined above, it is possible to define four categories of 
accident investigation methods, corresponding to the four quadrants of Figure 2. The set 
of 21 methods listed by Table 1 was first reduced to retain only prima facie accident 
investigation methods and to avoid overlapping methods. In consequence of this, the 
following methods have not been retained: CA (Change Analysis), ECFC (Events and 
causal factors charting), ECFCA (Events and Causal Factors Charting and Analysis), 
HFACS (Human Factors Analysis and Classification System), HFIT (Human factors 
investigation tool), HPES (Human Performance Enhancement System), PEAT 
(Procedural Event Analysis Tool), SAFER 2007, SCAT (Systematic Cause Analysis 
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Technique), STEP (Sequentially Timed Events Plotting), and TRACEr (Technique for 
Retrospective Analysis of Cognitive Errors). 
 
7.1 Methods suitable for systems that are loosely coupled and tractable 
In terms of frequency or numbers, most systems are loosely coupled and tractable even 
today. Although a NPP clearly is not among them, and although few other industries of 
concern are, many of the commonly used investigation methods nevertheless seem to be 
best suited for – or even to assume – that the systems they describe are loosely coupled 
and tractable. In practical terms this implies that it is possible both to have a more or 
less complete description of the system and to account for events (e.g., failures or 
malfunctions) one by one or element by element. While these assumptions make for 
methods that are easier or simpler in terms of use, they also means that such methods 
are unable to account for complex phenomena, hence to produce practically useful 
explanations of accidents of that nature. 
Each method is described by means of the following characteristics: 
z References: The main scientific referens or source of information that describes 
the method. 
z Related methods: Other methods of the same type or that use the same principle. 
z Main principle: The main analytical principle on which the method is based. 
z Procedure: The main steps in using the method. 
z Type of results: The main outcomes that the method produces. 
z Operational efficiency and methodological strength: how easy it is to use the 
method in practice and how much the method depends on the user's knowledge 
and experience. 
z Theoretical grounding, i.e., how well founded the concepts and categories are – 
in essence which accident model the method implies. 
z Practical value, i.e., how well the method support effective recommendations. 
 
There are several sub-categories of methods for loosely coupled and tractable systems. 
In the following four sub-categories will be described: (1) methods that focus on the 
identification of failed barriers, (2) methods that focus on human error, (3) methods that 
focus on root causes in isolation, and (4) methods that focus on root causes in 
combination. 
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Example of methods that focus on barriers and/or defences and explain accidents as 
the result of failed or deficient barriers 
Name: AEB (Accident Evolution and Barrier Analysis) 
References: Svensson, O. (2001). Accident and Incident Analysis Based on the Accident 
Evolution and Barrier Function ( AEB) Model. Cognition, Technology & Work, 
3(1), 42-52. 
Related 
methods: 
Barrier analysis methods in general that focus on the barriers that should, but 
did not, prevent the occurrence of an adverse event and/or an unwanted 
outcome. Barrier analysis is used to identify hazards associated with an 
accident and the barriers that should have been in place to prevent it. A 
barrier is any means used to control, prevent, or impede the hazard from 
reaching the target. barrier analysis addresses: barriers that were in place 
and how they performed, barriers that were in place but not used, barriers 
that were not in place but were required, barrier(s) that, if present or 
strengthened, would prevent the same or similar accidents from occurring in 
the future. 
Main principle: The Accident Evolution and Barrier Function (AEB) model provides a method 
for analysis of incidents and accidents that models the evolution towards an 
incident/accident as a series of interactions between human and technical 
systems. The interaction consists of failures, malfunctions or errors that 
could lead to or have resulted in an accident. The method forces analysts to 
integrate human and technical systems simultaneously when performing an 
accident analysis. 
Procedure: The method starts with the simple flow chart technique of the method. The 
flow chart initially consists of empty boxes in two parallel columns, one for 
the human systems and one for the technical systems. During the analysis 
these error boxes are identified as the failures, malfunctions or errors that 
constitute the accident evolution. In general, the sequence of error boxes in 
the diagram follows the time order of events. Between each pair of 
successive error boxes there is a possibility to arrest the evolution towards 
an incident/accident. 
An AEB analysis consists of two main phases. The first phase is to model the 
accident evolution in a flow diagram. AEB only models errors and is not an 
event sequence method. The second phase consists of the barrier function 
analysis. In this phase, the barrier functions are identified (ineffective and/or 
non existent). The same barrier function can be performed by different 
barrier function systems. Correspondingly, a barrier function system may 
perform different barrier functions. 
Type of results: An important purpose of the AEB-analysis is to identify broken barrier 
functions, the reasons for why there were no barrier functions or why the 
existing ones failed, and to suggest improvements. 
Operational 
efficiency and 
methodological 
strength: 
The method is simple to use due to its diagrammatic representation. But 
since it represents only what went wrong, rather than the whole sequence of 
events, it is limited in its ability to support recommendations and decisions 
about precautions and protections. In practice, it can only lead to 
recommendations about strengthening (failed) barriers. 
Theoretical 
grounding: 
The theoretical grounding is linear causality. The method is based on a 
simple linear accident model, and the graphical representation corresponds 
to a fault tree without combinations. The method recognises the interplay of 
human and technical systems. 
Practical value: The method has only had limited practical application. 
26
  
 
Examples of methods that focus on human error as the primary contributor to 
adverse events 
Name: Human Error in European Air Traffic Management (HERA)  
References:  Isaac, A., Shorrock, S. & Kirwan, B. (2002) Human error in European air traffic 
management: The HERA project. Reliability Engineering and System Safety, 
75(2), 257-272. 
Additional documentation is available from 
http://www.eurocontrol.int/humanfactors/public/standard_page/hera.html  
Related 
methods 
Technique for Retrospective Analysis of Cognitive Errors (TRACEr) 
Main principle: HERA is a method to identify and quantify the impact of the human factor in 
incident/accident investigation, safety management and prediction of potential 
new forms of errors arising from new technology. Human error is seen as a 
potential weak link in the ATM system and measures must therefore be taken 
to prevent errors and their impact, and to maximise other human qualities 
such as error detection and recovery. HERA is predicated on the notion that 
human error is the primary contributor to accidents and incidents. 
Procedure: 1. Defining the error type. 
2. Defining the error or rule breaking or violation behaviour through a 
flowchart. 
3. Identifying the Error Detail through a flowchart. 
4. Identifying the Error Mechanism and associated Information 
Processing failures through flowcharts. 
5. Identifying the tasks from tables. 
6. Identifying the Equipment and Information from tables. 
7. Identifying all the Contextual Conditions through a flowchart and 
tables. 
Type of results  Identification of human errors and violations. Quantitative data on the relative 
frequency of error types and working conditions. 
Operational 
efficiency and 
methodological 
strength  
HERA is supported by instruction manuals, courses, and some software tools. 
Given that the premises of the method are accepted (cf., below), it is therefore 
one of the more mature accident analysis methods. In practice, however, 
there are often some uncertainty about the precise definition and use of the 
categories of causes defined by HERA, e.g., violations, mistakes, etc.  
Theoretical 
grounding 
The theoretical grounding is linear causality and human error. As the name 
implies, the method only looks for instances of human errors as causes. The 
underlying theory is based on various types of human information processing 
models, as described, e.g., by Reason (1990). The method assumes that the 
primary cause of adverse events is the human error, and therefore look for 
this before considering the possible effect of performance shaping conditions. 
Practical value HERA is extensively used by European Air traffic Service organisations, 
although with varying degrees of success. Eurocontrol has supplemented the 
development of HERA with related methods, such as HERA-JANUS, HERA-
Observe, HERA-PREDICT, and HERA-SMART. The analysis results have 
been compiled into a database for the purpose of supporting risk assessment 
of future ATM systems. It is uncertain whether the approach can be 
transferred to the nuclear domain without a complete revision of the 
classification system used. 
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Examples of methods that focus on root causes 
Name: Root cause analysis (RCA) 
References:  Wilson, P. et. al. (1993). Root cause analysis – A tool for total quality 
management. Milwaukee, WI: Quality Press. 
According to Wikipedia, the first use of the term “root cause” can be found in 
1905 (an article in The Lancet). The term is widely used in the general 
literature, although there is no specific theory or model of RCA – apart from 
company brochures, of course. It is a philosophical rather than a scientific 
concept. 
Related 
methods 
TapRooT®
Main principle: Root cause analysis identifies underlying deficiencies in a safety management 
system that, if corrected, would prevent the same and similar accidents from 
occurring. Root cause analysis is a systematic process that uses the facts and 
results from the core analytic techniques to determine the most important 
reasons for the accident.  
Procedure: 1. Determine sequence of events 
2. Define causal factors 
3. Analyse each causal factor’s root causes 
4. Analyse each root cause’s generic causes 
5. Develop and evaluate corrective actions 
6. Report and implement corrective actions 
Type of results  Specific (root) causes that can be the object of specific remedial or corrective 
action.  
Operational 
efficiency and 
methodological 
strength  
Root cause analysis is used widely and supported by extensive training 
material and practical guidance (handbooks, triage cars, etc.). It is considered 
a very efficient method, and since the approach is a simple reverse tracing of 
causes, it is rather robust. The simplicity of the method, however, also means 
that the search is severely constrained, hence that the outcomes are limited to 
the categories defined by the method. 
Theoretical 
grounding 
A root cause is defined as “the causal factor(s) that, if corrected, would 
prevent recurrence of the accident. A root cause analysis is defined as any 
methodology that identifies the causal factors that, if corrected, would prevent 
recurrence of the accident. RCA therefore represents the single cause 
philosophy, I.e., the belief that there is a single cause for any outcome that, if 
prevented, would prevent the outcome itself. In this context, the root cause is 
the cause which dominates over all other contributing factors. The type of 
reasoning relies on the use of counterfactual conditionals. The problem is that 
one cannot logically conclude that the consequent will be false if the 
antecedent is false. In other words, one cannot conclude that if the root cause 
is removed, then the effects will not happen. The reason is simply that there 
may be several other ways in which the same effects can occur. 
Practical value Root cause analysis is widely used across many industries, including for 
healthcare and quality management (e.g., the Ishikawa fish-bone diagrams). 
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Examples of methods that combine multiple factors to explain accidents 
Name: HINT – J-HPES 
References:  Takano, K., Sawayanagi, K. & Kabetani, T. (1994). System for analysing and 
evaluating human-related nuclear power plant incidents. Journal of Nuclear 
Science Technology, 31, 894-913. 
INPO (1989). Human performance enhancement system: Coordinator manual 
(INPO 86-016, Rev. 02). Atlanta, GA: Institute of Nuclear Power Operations. 
Related 
methods 
The Human Performance Evaluation System (HPES), originally developed by 
the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations in 1987 (INPO, 1989), uses a family 
of techniques to investigate events, with particular emphasis on determining 
human performance aspects. The HPES methodology incorporates many 
tools such as task analysis, change analysis, barrier analysis, cause and 
effect analysis, and event and causal factor charting. Additionally, many 
similar methodologies have been developed from HPES and adapted where 
necessary to suit the specific requirements of individual organizations.  
Main principle: HINT is a recent development of J-HPES, the Japanese version of the HPES. 
The overall principle is to use a root cause analysis of small events to identify 
trends, and to use this as a basis for proactive prevention of accidents. The 
same principles can be found in SAFER, although the latter method has a 
wider scope, and therefore may be applicable to accidents in tightly coupled 
systems as well. 
Procedure: The method comprises the following four steps.  
Step 1. Understand the event.  
Step 2: Collect and classify causal factor data.  
Step 3: Causal analysis, using root cause analysis.  
Step 4: Proposal of countermeasures. 
Type of results  The method focuses on minor human error events. It is intended to provide a 
trend analysis of these, to enable proactive prevention of serious accidents. 
Operational 
efficiency and 
methodological 
strength  
The steps of the method are described on a rather high level, and are 
therefore best applied by people with considerable experience in both the 
domain and in human factors. The method is aimed at accident investigation 
rather than accident analysis, but is less direct and explicit in steps 1, 2, and 4 
than in step 3. 
Theoretical 
grounding 
The method is a variant of root cause analysis enriched by concerns for 
human and organisational factors (cf., HPES).  
Practical value The method is promoted by the Central Institute for Electric Power Industry 
(CRIEPI) in Japan. It is presented as an error preventing method for industry 
and business in general, but the actual level of application is unknown. 
 
7.2 Methods suitable for systems that are tightly coupled and tractable 
The increasing frequency of non-trivial accidents during the 1980s and 1990s made it 
clear that many of these could not be explained as a result of sequences or chains of 
events, but that it was necessary to account for how combinations of multiple sequences 
of events, or of events and latent conditions, could arise. This led to the proposal of 
models that often are classified as epidemiological (Hollnagel, 2004). The prototype is 
the Swiss cheese model. 
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Name: The Swiss cheese model (SCM) 
References:  Reason, J. T. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge University Press 
Related 
methods: 
The TRIPOD concept and set of methods, which in a sense also is the origin 
of the SCM. The idea behind TRIPOD is that organisational failures are the 
main factors in accident causation. These factors are more “latent” and, when 
contributing to an accident, are always followed by a number of technical and 
human errors. 
HFACS (Human Factors Analysis and Classification System), used by the 
Federal Aviation Agency (US). 
Main principle: In the Swiss Cheese model, an organization's defences against failure are 
modelled as a series of barriers, represented as slices of Swiss cheese. The 
holes in the cheese slices represent individual weaknesses in individual parts 
of the system, and are continually varying in size and position in all slices. The 
system as a whole produces failures when all of the holes in each of the slices 
momentarily align, permitting "a trajectory of accident opportunity", so that a 
hazard passes through all of the holes in all of the defenses, leading to a 
failure. 
Procedure: The basic method for using the SCM is to trace backwards from the accident. 
The analysis looks for two main phenomena: active failures, which are the 
unsafe acts committed by people (slips, lapses, fumbles, mistakes, and 
procedural violations); and latent conditions, which arise from decisions made 
by designers, builders, procedure writers, and top level management. Latent 
conditions can translate into error provoking conditions within the local 
workplace and they can create long-lasting holes or weaknesses in the 
defences. Unlike active failures, whose specific forms are often hard to 
foresee, latent conditions can be identified and remedied before an adverse 
event occurs. Understanding this leads to proactive rather than reactive risk 
management. 
Type of 
results: 
Identification, and classification, of active failures and latent conditions. 
Operational 
efficiency and 
methodological 
strength: 
The method is initially easy to use, but in its original form lack operational 
details. This has been remedied in various institutionalised version (e.g., by 
SHELL), but it still requires an appreciable level of experience to use 
effectively. The method is supported by a rather extensive set of instructional 
materials, tutorials, web-based instructions, etc. 
Theoretical 
grounding: 
The method represents a complex, linear model. It is quite similar to a fault 
tree, although the common graphical representation is different – and less 
detailed. The method focuses on human errors in combination with latent 
operational conditions, and distinguishes between failures at the sharp and 
the blunt ends. 
Practical value: The model was originally propounded by James Reason, and has since 
gained widespread acceptance and use in healthcare, in the aviation safety 
industry, and in emergency service organizations. It has recently been called 
into question by several authors. 
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Name: MTO (Människa-Teknologi-Organisation or Man-Technology-
Organisation) 
References:  Rollenhagen, C. (1995)*. MTO – En Introduktion: Sambandet Människa, 
Teknik och Organisation. Lund, Sweden: Studentlitteratur. 
Bento, J.-P. (1992). Människa, teknik och organisation. Kurs i MTO-analys för 
Socialstyrelsen. Studsvik, Nyköping: Kärnkraftsäkerhet och Utbildnings AB. 
Worledge, D. (1992). Role of human performance in emergency systems 
management. Annual Review of Energy and the Environment, 17, 285-300. 
Related 
methods: 
The method is based on INPO’s HPES (Human Performance Enhancement 
System) described above. 
Main principle: The basis for the MTO-analysis is that human, organisational, and technical 
factors should be focused equally in an accident investigation. 
Procedure: An MTO investigation comprises three methods: 
1. Structured analysis by use of an event- and cause-diagram. 
2. Change analysis by describing how events have deviated from earlier 
events or common practice. 
3. Barrier analysis by identifying technological and administrative 
barriers which have failed or are missing. 
The first step in an MTO-analysis is to develop the event sequence 
longitudinally and illustrate the event sequence in a block diagram. Then, to 
identify possible technical and human causes of each event and draw these 
vertically to the events in the diagram. The next step is to make a change 
analysis, i.e. to assess how events in the accident progress have deviated 
from normal situation, or common practice. Further, to analyse which 
technical, human or organisational barriers have failed or were missing during 
the accident progress. The basic questions in the analysis are: 
z What may have prevented the continuation of the accident sequence? 
z What may the organisation have done in the past in order to prevent the 
accident? 
The last step in the MTO-analysis is to identify and present recommendations. 
These should be as realistic and specific as possible, and might be technical, 
human or organisational. 
Type of 
results: 
Details and clarification of factors that either led to or contributed to the 
accident. 
Operational 
efficiency and 
methodological 
strength: 
The use of the method is supported by instruction materials and books. It is 
fairly easy to use, but is not recommended for novices. The identification of 
specific causes and conditions relies more on experience than on a well-
defined set of categories. The method includes several aspects of a full 
accident investigation, including the recommendations. 
Theoretical 
grounding: 
The method refers to a complex, linear accident model. The common 
representation is, however, more in the nature of a fish bone diagram than a 
fault tree. The method tends to consider causal factors one by one, rather 
than in a larger context. 
Practical value: The MTO method has been extensively used by the Swedish NPPs. The 
principle is also widely used in other domains, such as traffic safety and 
aviation. The MTO methods has many features common with other methods 
(Swiss cheese, HPES), but distinguishes itself from the single-factor methods. 
 *SKI comment: Rollenhagen has a bool from 2003 on the subject. 
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Name: Cognitive Reliability and Error Assessment Method (CREAM) 
References: Hollnagel, E. (1998). Cognitive reliability and error analysis method. Oxford, 
UK: Elsevier Science Ltd. 
Related 
methods: 
CREAM is a so-called second generation HRA methods, but differs from other 
methods of the same type (ATHEANA, MERMOS) by being explicitly 
developed for both accident investigation and risk assessment. 
Main principle: CREAM was developed to be used both predictively and retrospectively. 
CREAM uses the Contextual Control Model (COCOM) as a basis for defining 
four different control modes (strategic, tactical, opportunistic, scrambled). It is 
assumed that a lower degree of control corresponds to less reliable 
performance. The level of control is mainly determined by the common 
performance conditions (CPC). The retrospective use (accident analysis) is 
based on a clear distinction between that which can be observed (called 
phenotypes) and that which must be inferred (called genotypes). The 
genotypes used in CREAM are divided into three categories: individual, 
technological and organisational, corresponding to the MTO triplet. 
Procedure: The procedure for CREAM comprises the following steps: 
1. Produce a description of what actually happened 
2. Characterise Common Performance conditions 
3. Produce a time-line description of significant events 
4. Select all actions of interest 
5. For each action, identify failure mode (this is done iteratively) 
6. For each failure mode, find relevant antecedent-consequent links (this 
is done recursively) 
7. Provide overall description and draw conclusions. 
Type of 
results: 
A graph, or a network, of antecedent actions (functions) and conditions that 
together constitute an effective explanation of the accident. The graph shows 
how various actions and conditions affected each other in the given situation. 
Operational 
efficiency and 
methodological 
strength: 
The CREAM method is clearly described, but not easy to use. This is due to 
the non-hierarchical nature of the method. The method, however, produces a 
clear audit trail, which enhances the reliability. The method has recently been 
supported by a computerised navigation tool, which makes it easier to use, 
once it has been learned. 
Theoretical 
grounding: 
The method does not look for specific causes, but rather for the operational 
conditions that can lead to a loss of control, hence accidents. It is grounded in 
cognitive systems engineering. Similar to other second generation methods it 
rejects consider human error as a meaningful causal category. The basis for 
the analysis is the event as it happened, rather than preconceived causal 
factors. 
Practical value: CREAM is a borderline method that in principle can be applied also to 
accidents in intractable systems. However, the emphasis on tractability of past 
events, if not of the system itself, means that it should primarily be thought of 
for use with tractable systems. 
CREAM has been used extensively in Norway and Sweden as a specific 
method for traffic accidents under the name of DREAM (D stands for Driver). 
There has also been a number of uses of the proactive version of CREAM for 
risk assessment, for instance for NPP emergency procedures and space 
station operations. 
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7.3 Methods suitable for systems that are loosely coupled and 
intractable 
There are no investigation methods in this category. The reason for that has to do with 
the historical development of accident models and investigation methods. At the 
beginning, effectively in the 1930s, industrial systems were loosely coupled and 
tractable. As technologies and societies developed, systems became more tightly 
coupled through vertical and horisontal integration, and at the same time less tractable 
because new technologies allowed faster operations with more extensive automation. 
The latter meant in particular that they became more or less self-regulating under 
normal conditions, which reduced tractability. Since accidents ‘followed’ these 
developments, methods were developed to be able to adress the new problems. 
Conversely, few if any accident of note took place in loosely coupled, intractable 
systems, hence no methods were developed to account for that. The basic reason is that 
such systems are social rather than technological, e.g., universities, research companies, 
and the like. 
 
7.4 Methods suitable for systems that are tightly coupled and 
intractable 
The continuously growing complexity of socio-technical systems, and the consequent 
reduction of tractability, has led to a fundamental change in the approach to risk and 
safety. The most prominent example of that is the development resilience engineering 
(Hollnagel, Woods & Leveson, 2006), which changes the focus from failures and 
actions gone wrong to the usefulness of normal performance variability. With respect to 
accident investigations this means that the aim is to understand how adverse events can 
be the result of unexpected combinations of variations in normal performance, thereby 
avoiding the need to look for a human error or root cause. 
This view is often referred to as a systemic view. There are presently two main 
proposals for a method, STAMP and FRAM. 
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Name: System-theoretic model of accidents (STAMP) 
References: Leveson, N. G. (2004). A New Accident Model for Engineering Safer Systems. 
Science, 42(4), 237-270. 
Related 
methods: 
Some relation, but not strong, to control theoretic methods such as Acci-map. 
Also some similarity to the Why-Because Analysis (WBA), cf. 
http://www.rvs.uni-bielefeld.de/research/WBA/ 
Main principle: The hypothesis underlying STAMP is that system theory is a useful way to 
analyze accidents, particularly system accidents. Accidents occur when 
external disturbances, component failures, or dysfunctional interactions 
among system components are not adequately handled by the control 
system. Safety is viewed as a control problem, and is managed via 
constraints by a control structure embedded in an adaptive socio-technical 
system. Understanding why an accident occurred requires determining why 
the control structure was ineffective. Preventing future accidents requires 
designing a control structure that will enforce the necessary constraints. 
Systems are viewed as interrelated components that are kept in a state of 
dynamic equilibrium by feedback loops of information and control. STAMP 
claims to be general method for explanation of mishaps with teleological 
systems 
Procedure: Uses a feedback control system as a specific causal model. The analysis 
proceeds along the following lines: 
1. In teleological systems, various subsystems maintain constraints 
which prevent accidents 
2. If an accident has occurred, these constraints have been violated 
3. STAMP Investigates the systems involved, especially human-
organisational subsystems, to identify missing or inappropriate 
features (those which fail to maintain the constraints) 
4. It proceeds through analysing feedback & control (F&C) operations 
Type of 
results: 
The most basic component of STAMP is not an event, but a constraint. 
Accidents are therefore viewed as resulting from interactions among 
components that violate the system safety constraints. The control processes 
that enforce these constraints must limit system behavior to the safe changes 
and adaptations implied by the constraints. Inadequate control may result 
from missing safety constraints, inadequately communicated constraints, or 
from constraints that are not enforced correctly at a lower level. 
Operational 
efficiency and 
methodological 
strength: 
STAMP can systematically uncover organisational structures and direct the 
analyst to ask revealing questions. Since STAMP is an analysis method on ly, 
it depends very much on the quality of the investigation report (data, 
information). Due to the complexity of the underlying model (cf., below), it 
requires a considerable effort to use, and is in its present state only fitted for 
experienced users. A method for a structured presentation of results is not 
currently available. 
Theoretical 
grounding: 
STAMP uses a specific causal model, i.e., a feedback control system. The 
basic principle is that an accident occurs when operational constraints have 
been violated. STAMP investigates systems involved, especially human-
organisational subsystems, to identify missing or inappropriate features (those 
which fail to maintain the constraints). It proceeds through analysing feedback 
& control (F&C) operations, which replaces the traditional chain-of-events 
model. The model includes software, organizations, management, human 
decision-making, and migration of systems over time to states of heightened 
risk. 
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Practical value: STAMP has not been widely used and must still be considered under 
development. The pros and cons of the method have been debated in the 
RISK forum (http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/risks). 
 
Name: Functional Resonance Accident Model (FRAM) 
References: Hollnagel, E. (2004). Barriers and accident prevention. Ashgate. 
Nouvel, D.; Travadel, S. & Hollnagel, E. (2007). Introduction of the concept of 
functional resonance in the analysis of a near-accident in aviation. Ispra, 
November 2007, 33rd ESReDA Seminar: Future challenges of accident 
investigation. 
Sawaragi, T.; Horiguchi, Y. & Hina, A. (2006). Safety analysis of systemic 
accidents triggered by performance deviation. Bexco, Busan, South Korea, 
October 18-21. SICE-ICASE International Joint Conference 2006. 
Related 
methods: 
There is some relationship to methods such as variation trees or variation 
diagrams, although these were developed for tractable and loosely coupled 
systems. 
Main principle: A method for accident investigation as well as risk assessment based on a 
description of system functions. Non-linear propagation of events are 
described by means of functional resonance, trigered by normal performance 
variability. 
Procedure: 1. Define the purpose of modelling and describe the situation being 
analysed. 
2. Identify essential system functions; characterise each function by six 
basic parameters (input, output, time, control, pre-conditions, 
resources). 
3. Characterise the (context dependent) potential variability using a 
checklist. Consider both normal and worst case variability. 
4. Define functional resonance based on possible dependencies 
(couplings) among functions. 
5. Identify barriers for variability (damping factors) and specify required 
performance monitoring. 
Type of 
results:  
The analysis uncovers dependencies among functions or tasks that normally 
are missed. It also identifies the information needed for the investigation. The 
concrete result can be a graphical rendering of how the accident developed 
and/or a detailed written description. 
Operational 
efficiency and 
methodological 
strength: 
The method is structurally simple and covers several of the accident 
investigation phases. It, however, requires an initial learning period, due to its 
different theoretical grounding (cf., below). Since the method does not include 
a set of causal categories (taxonomy), it is necessary that the user has 
extensive experience with the domain, as well as with human and 
organisational factors. FRAM is supported by a software tool (the FRAM 
visualizer). 
Theoretical 
grounding: 
FRAM is based on a specific theory of functional resonance. This enables it to 
account for non-linear interactions and to dispense with the classical cause-
effect relation. The basis, both for analysis and for risk assessment, is a 
description of system functions (including MTO), rather than system structures 
or components. It is therefore easily scalable. 
Practical value: FRAM has been used extensively in several different domains (Aviation, Air 
Traffic Management, Critical Information Infrastructures, Emergency 
Management, Offshore, Healthcare). 
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 8 Discussion and conclusions 
One way of summarising the characterisation of the nine accident investigation methods 
described in the preceding chapter is to map them onto the modified Perrow diagram of 
Figure 2. The result is shown in Figure 3. This shows that most methods are applicable 
to tractable systems, or rather that the assumption is that the systems are tractable. 
Conversely, one may conclude that these methods should not be used for intractable 
systems, since they will not be able to produce adequate explanations. Several of the 
commonly used methods, including root cause analysis, AEB, and HERA, also require 
that systems only are loosely coupled; in other words, they are unable to account for the 
consequences of tight couplings, hence adequately to explain accidents in systems of 
that type. 
 
 
It is sensible to assume that any method would be just about adequate for the typical 
type of problems at the time it was developed. Indeed, there would be little reason to 
develop a method that was too complex or more powerful than required. As argued in 
the beginning, new methods are usually developed because the existing methods at 
some point in time encounter problems for which they are inefficient or inadequate. 
This, in turn, happens because the socio-technical systems where accidents happen 
continue to develop and to become more complex and more tightly coupled. The 
inevitable result is that even new methods after a while become underpowered because 
the nature of the problems change, although they may have been perfectly adequate for 
the problems they were developed for in the first place. 
The position of the various methods on the diagram in Figure 3 presents a 
characterisation of the methods using the two dimensions of coupling and tractability, 
and thereby indirectly represents the developments of socio-technical systems since the 
1930s. Without going into the details of this development, the third quadrant can be 
seen as representing industrial systems before the middle of the 20th Century, i.e., before 
the large scale application of information technology. The development since then has 
Figure 
3: Characterisation of accident investigation methods
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been one in terms of tighter coupling (moving up into the first quadrant) and a loss of 
tractability (moving right into the second quadrant). This has in turn required the 
development of new methods, as shown in the diagram. 
The position of a method reflects the assumptions behind the method, specifically what 
has been called the accident model. The arguments for each method were presented 
above. To illustrate the significance of the position, consider for instance the two 
extremes RCA and FRAM. 
z Root cause analysis (RCA) assumes that adverse outcomes can be described as 
the outcome of a sequence (or sequences) of events or a chain (or chains) of 
causes and effects. The investigation is therefore a backwards tracing from the 
accident, trying to find the effective cause(s). The method requires that the 
system is tractable, since it otherwise would be impossible to carry out this 
backwards tracing. The method also requires that the system is only loosely 
coupled, since it otherwise would be impossible to feel confident that the 
correction or elimination of the root cause would prevent a recurrence of the 
accident. 
z The functional resonance accident model (FRAM) assumes that adverse 
outcomes are the result of unexpected combinations of normal variability of 
system functions. In other words, it is the tight couplings that lead to adverse 
outcomes and not sequences of cause(s) and effect(s). Since the investigation 
furthermore looks for functions rather than structures, it is less problematic if the 
description is intractable. Indeed, functions may come and go over time whereas 
system structures must be more permanent. Functions are associated with the 
social organisation of work and the demands of a specific situation. Structures 
are associated with the physical system and equipment, which does not change 
from situation to situation. 
 
This characterisation does not mean that FRAM is a better method than RCA. (A 
similar argument can be made for any other comparison of two methods.) But it does 
mean that FRAM is well-suited for some kinds of problems and that RCA is well-suited 
for others. (It of course also means that there are problems for which either method is 
ill-suited.). 
In order to choose the right method to investigate an accident it is necessary first of all 
to characterise the accident. This can be achieved by asking a number of questions, for 
example: 
1. Was the accident similar to something that has happened before, or was it new 
and unknown? (The reference should be the history of the installation, as well as 
industry wide.). 
2. Was the organisation ready to respond to the accident, in the sense that there 
were established procedures or guidelines available? 
3. Was the situation quickly brought under control or was the development 
lengthy? 
4. Was the accident and the material consequences confined to a clearly delimited 
subsystem (technological or organisational) or did it involve multiple 
subsystems, or the whole installation? 
5. Were the consequences on the whole expected / familiar or were they novel / 
unusual? 
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6. Were the consequences in proportion to the initiating event, or were they 
unexpectedly large (or small)? 
 
(When considering these questions one should bear in mind, of course, that the answers 
rely on an initial and informal understanding of what may have happened. An 
experienced accident investigator should be able to do this without being biased by 
premature assumptions about the nature of the cause.). 
The first three questions illustrate issues that relate to the dimension of tractability. If 
the questions are answered positively, it indicates that the system was tractable, at least 
to some degree. The opposite is the case if the questions were answered negatively. 
Questions 4-6 illustrate issues that relate to the dimension of coupling. If the questions 
are answered positively, it indicates that the system was of the loosely coupled type. 
The opposite is the case if the questions were answered negatively. 
In conclusion, when faced with the need to investigate an accident it is important that 
the method chosen is appropriate for the system and the situation, i.e., that it is capable 
of providing an explanation. If the accident concerns the NPP operation as a whole, the 
problems correspond to the characteristics of the second quadrant. The investigation 
method must therefore be able to address systems of that nature. If the accident only 
concerns the operation of a subsystem or a component, the problems may correspond to 
the characteristics of the first or even the third quadrant. The investigation method can 
also therefore be different. The six questions given above suggest how the 
characteristics of the accident can be determined. 
In addition to that other concerns may also play a role, such as resource demands, ease 
of use, and consistency with other methods within the organisation or industry. While it 
may be convenient, or even necessary, for an organisation to adopt a specific method as 
its standard, this should always be done knowingly and with a willingness to reconsider 
the choice when the conditions so demand it. Socio-technical systems, processes, and 
organisations continuously change and develop, driven by internal and external forces 
and demands. The methods that are available to manage those systems and to 
investigate them when something goes awry, change at a much slower rate. Changes are 
furthermore usually discrete rather than continuous. The often felt consequence of this 
is that the available methods lag behind reality, often by as much as a decade or two. 
The diagram of Figure 3 therefore only represents the situation at the time of writing, 
i.e., around 2008. In five or ten years we must expect that the methods positioned in 
quadrant 2 slowly will have been displaced towards quadrant 3, not because the 
methods have changed but because the systems have. New and more powerful methods 
will – hopefully – by then have been developed to accommodate this state of affairs. 
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9 Dictionary 
 
 Engelska Svenska 
ATHEANA A Technique for Human Event Analysis En teknik för mänsklig händelseanalys 
CICA Caractéristique Importante de la 
Conduite Accidentelle 
Karakteristika för olycksanalys 
CPC Common Performance Conditions Kontextuella förutsättningar 
CREAM Cognitive Reliability and Error Analysis 
Method 
Kognitiv pålitlighets- och felanalysmetod 
DKV Operational Readiness Verification 
(ORV) 
Driftklarhetsverifiering 
EFC Error-Forcing Context Felhandlingsdrivande kontext 
ETTO Efficiency-Thoroughness Trade-Off Effektivitets- och noggrannhetsavvägning 
FRAM Functional Resonance Accident Model Resonansolycksmodell 
HPES Human Performance Enhancement 
System 
Mänskligt handlingsförbättrande system 
INPO Institute of Nuclear Power Operation Institutet för kärnkraftsdrift (USA) 
MERMOS Méthode d'Evaluation des Missions 
Opérateurs pour la Sécurité 
Säkerhetsutvärderingsmetod för 
operatörer 
MTO Man-Technology-Organisation Människa – Teknik - Organisation 
ORV Operational Readiness Verification Driftklarhetsverifiering 
WANO World Association of Nuclear Operators Världsorganisationen för kärnkraftsdrift 
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